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ABSTRACT 
 
Recently, regulators and policy makers who witnessed the global financial crisis during 2007–
2009 began considering a variety of ways to enhance auditor independence and financial 
reporting quality, ultimately aiming at investor protection. Since the enactment of the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation (MAFR) requirement has once 
again received significant attention from regulators and policy makers around the world, 
including the European Union (EU) and the U.S. Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB). In this paper, we investigate whether MAFR enhances audit quality in Korea. We find 
that under MAFR, newly rotated auditors are more likely to issue first-time going-concern audit 
opinions to financially distressed firms during their initial (first-year) financial statement audit 
compared with under the Voluntary Audit Firm Change (VAFC). Moreover, firms audited by 
mandatorily rotated new auditors have less discretionary accruals and higher accrual quality 
than those audited by voluntarily switched new auditors during the initial audit engagement. 
These results of earnings quality are more pronounced for firms that received a first-time going-
concern audit opinion during the initial financial statement audit under MAFR. Taken together, 
the findings suggest that MAFR produces better audit quality than the VAFC. Further, our study 
provides implications for regulators and policy makers of countries considering the adoption of 
MAFR.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
his paper investigates the impact of the Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation (MAFR) requirement on 
auditor reporting decision and financial reporting quality using MAFR data in Korean capital 
markets.
1
 
 
After high-profile accounting scandals such as Enron and WorldCom, the U.S. Congress passed the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) on July 30, 2002 to enhance corporate governance and improve financial reporting 
quality. SOX prescribes many important requirements with which public companies and their auditors must comply: 
disclosure requirements for the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, audit committee 
independence, or audit partner rotation. At that time, although MAFR was hotly debated among regulators, policy 
makers, academics, and the auditing profession, U.S. policy makers had not finally adopted the requirement. 
However, regulators and policy makers who witnessed the global financial crisis during 2007–2009 once again 
raised doubts regarding the credibility of audited financial statements. Regulators and policy makers, particularly in 
                                                 
1 The Korean audit market provides a unique setting for the study of the effectiveness of the MAFR requirement. In Korea, the MAFR 
requirement was effective from 2006 to 2010. During that period, MAFR and the Voluntary Audit Firm Change (VAFC) co-existed in Korea’s 
audit market. First, according to the past Korean MAFR requirement, firms cannot keep their same external auditor for six years. Second, firms 
cannot change their auditors within three years, indicating that auditors are guaranteed at least the first three-year audits for their audit clients. 
That is, the clients are able to change their auditors three years after the initial audit engagement. Therefore, the research setting in Korea 
provides us with a unique opportunity to collectively investigate the effect of each of MAFR and VAFC on auditor reporting decisions and 
accrual quality during the same period. 
T 
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the United States and the European Union (EU), announced new potential remedies for improving financial 
reporting quality, such as MAFR, restrictions on more non-audit services, or mandatory tendering for appointing 
auditors (PCAOB, 2011; European Commission, 2010).
2
 Once again, MAFR received significant attention from 
regulators. Using MAFR data in Korean capital markets, in this study, we investigate two research questions: 1) Is a 
new auditor under MAFR more willing to issue a first-time going-concern audit opinion (FGCO) to financially 
distressed firms? and 2) Do firms audited by mandatorily rotated auditors have better earnings quality such as lower 
discretionary accruals and higher accruals quality?
3
 
 
Regulators, academics, and the audit profession face both pros and cons regarding the adoption of MAFR. 
Proponents of MAFR argue that the requirement enhances auditor independence through fresh eyes and reduces a 
probability of developing personal relationships with audit clients. Meanwhile, opponents of MAFR argue that the 
mandatory rotation of auditors after a certain period produces an inefficient audit because of the high start-up costs 
of an initial audit and because understanding a client’s business and industry takes time, which is a key factor for a 
risk-based audit. Accordingly, prior relevant studies (e.g., Blouin et al., 2007; Kaplan and Mauldin, 2008; Chi et al., 
2011) on the association between MAFR and financial reporting quality provide mixed results. For example, Blouin 
et al. (2007) report that financial reporting quality after an auditor change does not improve for former Arthur 
Andersen clients under forced auditor changes. However, in an experimental MAFR setting, Dopuch et al. (2001) 
show that auditors are more independent. Additionally, Nagy (2005) provides the supporting evidence for the 
adoption of MAFR that discretionary accruals are lower for smaller former Arthur Andersen clients after they 
switched auditors. Further, several studies exist on the association between auditor tenure and financial reporting 
quality under VAFC that provide indirect evidence on the effectiveness of MAFR. Most of the prior literature (e.g., 
Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002; Johnson et al., 2002; Myers et al., 2003; Ghosh and Moon, 2005; Li, 2010; Chi et 
al., 2011) provides mixed empirical results on the association between MAFR and financial reporting quality, such 
as discretionary accruals, audit failure, accounting conservatism, and earnings response coefficients. Although 
adopting MAFR comes with theoretically obvious costs and benefits, there is still little research on the effectiveness 
of the requirement. In this paper, we fill the gap by investigating the association between MAFR and auditor 
reporting decisions or earnings quality using data from Korean capital markets. 
 
Although new auditors under MAFR have fresh eyes and are perceived as more objective and independent, 
they have little knowledge of their new client’s business and industry. If the former outweighs the latter, the new 
auditors are expected to make more appropriate reporting decisions regarding their financial statement audits 
compared with Voluntary Audit Firm Change (VAFC). In addition, firms audited by new auditors under MAFR are 
more likely to have better earnings quality. However, if the new auditors lack fresh eyes and independence along 
with little knowledge of their clients’ business and industry, we expect that their reporting decision or clients’ 
earnings quality under MAFR is likely to be unchanged or, perhaps worse, compared with VAFC. Therefore, the 
association of MAFR with audit quality or earnings quality is still hotly debated and remains an empirically open 
question.  
 
In this paper, we test the association between FGCOs and earnings quality and MAFR during the first-year 
financial statement audit compared with VAFC.
4
 Consistent with the argument made by MAFR proponents, we find 
that new auditors under MAFR are more likely to issue a FGCO to financially distressed firms during their initial 
audits compared with voluntarily switched new auditors after controlling for factors affecting going-concern audit 
opinion decisions. This result suggests that the mandatorily rotated new auditors make more appropriate reporting 
decisions through fresh eyes and enhanced independence. We also find that firms audited by mandatorily rotated 
                                                 
2 Recently the European Parliament endorsed proposed mandatory audit firm rotation adoption, which allows public-interest entities (e.g., listed 
companies, banks, and insurance companies) to keep their auditor up to 10 years, and after that, have to change the auditor. However, the 
mandatory rotation period can be extended to 20 years if the audit is put out for bid, or 24 years in cases of joint audits (Tysiac, 2014).   
3 Following Dodd et al. (1984) and Loudder et al. (1992), in this paper, a first-time going-concern audit opinion (FGCO) firm is defined as the 
firm that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year’s financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion for previous fiscal 
year’s financial statements 
4 In Korea, both mandatorily rotated and voluntarily switched auditors are only guaranteed their financial statement audit for the first three years 
from the initial engagement, which cannot be lengthen over six years under Korean MAFR requirement. Thus, with close to third year audit, all 
auditors’ independence may not be impaired due to next three-year audit renewal. Thus, we judge that the first-year audit after mandatory rotation 
or voluntary change is more appropriate to compare the effectiveness between Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation (MAFR) and Voluntary Audit 
Firm Change (VAFC). In this study, we focus on the first-year audit engagement. 
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auditors have lower signed discretionary accruals and higher accruals quality than firms audited by voluntarily 
switched auditors during the first-year audit engagement. This finding is particularly more pronounced for FGCO 
firms, suggesting that new auditors under MAFR conduct their initial audits more objectively, independently, and 
conservatively to minimize potential litigation risk caused by audit failure (Bell et al., 2001; Kwon et al., 2011).  
 
Our paper contributes to the relevant research stream as follows. First, as a proxy for audit quality, we use 
the going-concern audit opinion (GCO), a more direct measure of audit quality, whereas prior literature (DeFond et 
al., 2002; Weber and Willenborg, 2003; Lennox, 2005; Geiger et al., 2005; Francis and Yu, 2009; Reichelt and 
Wang, 2010) used discretionary accruals or auditor conservatism to examine the effectiveness of MAFR. Second, 
we provide additional evidence on the effectiveness of the adoption of MAFR. In the middle of the recent global 
financial crisis, regulators and policy makers all over the world began considering MAFR adoption. In particular, 
U.S. regulators have been seriously considering MAFR adoption and, in 2014, the European Union decided to adopt 
MAFR from the middle of 2016. Thus, the findings in our paper will provide significant inputs to countries 
considering MAFR adoption or that have already adopted MAFR.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the related literature and 
develop the hypotheses. Section III describes the research design and sample and data. Section IV presents the 
empirical results and Section V provides conclusions and implications. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
Before the PCAOB issued a concept release on MAFR in 2011, the U.S. Congress had already considered 
the adoption of MAFR to enhance auditor independence and required the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
to study the effectiveness of MAFR adoption as part of SOX 2002. In November 2003, the GAO issued its study, 
Public Accounting Firms: Required Study on the Potential Effects of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation. After 
reviewing the report, the U.S. Congress decided to not adopt MAFR. 
 
However, the recent global crisis caused regulators and policy makers to reconsider adopting MAFR to 
increase auditor independence, which is regarded as one of the most important factors to enhance financial reporting 
quality. In fact, MAFR can both positively and negatively affect audit quality and financial reporting quality. As 
audit tenure increases, a long-term personal relationship or economic bonding is easily perceived to develop 
between auditors and their clients and in turn may impair auditors’ independence, eventually leading to deterioration 
of financial reporting quality. Accordingly, proponents of MAFR argue that the requirement plays a key role in 
preventing a long-term relationship between an auditor and its client from turning into a personal relationship 
between the two parties. Additionally, because new auditors under MAFR have a fresh look at their clients’ financial 
statements, they are more likely to identify questionable accounting practices and/or detect material misstatements in 
the financial statements. However, opponents of MAFR argue that the requirement may increase start-up costs and 
make auditors rely excessively on management estimates and representations during the initial year of the audit 
engagement because of a lack of understanding of a client’s business and industry. This argument suggests that new 
auditors under MAFR are less likely to utilize client-specific knowledge for their initial audits (Myers et al., 2003). 
Further, a periodically mandated rotation may prevent auditors from completely capitalizing on acquired client-
specific knowledge for future audits.  
 
In audit markets, auditors may be changed voluntarily or rotated mandatorily. Currently, most countries, 
including the United States and the United Kingdom, have not adopted MAFR. Therefore, empirical evidence on the 
effect of MAFR on audit quality and/or financial reporting quality is indirectly provided by examining the 
association between auditor tenure and audit quality and/or financial reporting quality. Several prior studies (e.g., 
Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002; Johnson et al., 2002; Myers et al., 2003; Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Crabtree et al., 
2006; Ghosh and Moon, 2005; Jenkins and Velury, 2008) document that audit tenure is positively associated with 
proxies for financial reporting quality, such as the probability of audit failure, discretionary accruals, fraudulent 
financial reporting, earnings response coefficients, and accounting conservatism, suggesting no support of MAFR 
adoption. Meanwhile, consistent with proponents’ argument for MAFR adoption, Li (2010) shows that audit tenure 
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is negatively correlated with earnings conservatism, particularly for small firms audited by Big N auditors. 
Additionally, Chi et al. (2011) provide mixed results on the effectiveness of MAFR that audit tenure is negatively 
(positively) associated with discretionary accruals (real earnings management). 
 
In Europe, a few countries (e.g., Spain, Italy, and Portugal) adopted MAFR. In Spain, the rotation 
requirement enacted in 1988 required that audit firms be mandatorily rotated every nine years but was subsequently 
abolished in 1997. Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2009) report that the number of GCOs during the MAFR period did not 
increase, implying no positive impact of MAFR on audit quality.
5 
 
 
Italy also adopted MAFR in 1974, requiring firms to switch their auditor every nine years. The SDA Bocconi 
University Report (2002) shows that MAFR in Italy leads to additional audit costs, stronger concentration of the 
audit market, and deterioration in audit quality. Meanwhile, the results of interviews and questionnaires conducted 
with firms’ managers and auditors show enhanced public confidence on financial reporting since the MAFR 
adoption. In addition, Cameran et al. (2014) report lower earnings quality for the first three years following 
mandatory rotation and higher audit hours and fees in the initial audit year whereas, Corbella et al. (2012) show that 
firms report more income-decreasing abnormal accruals after MAFR adoption, suggesting that auditors are more 
conservative in conducting financial statement audits.
6 
 
 
In Korea, all listed companies on the KSE and KOSDAQ except for foreign companies and domestic 
companies listed on the foreign stock exchanges such as the NYSE, NASDAQ, or London Stock Exchange were 
required to mandatorily rotate their auditor every six years. The MAFR requirement was effective only from 2006 to 
2010. After the adoption of MAFR in Korea, academic institutions conducted a variety of studies on the impact of 
MAFR on audit quality and/or financial reporting quality using various proxies such as discretionary accruals (Noh, 
2009; Kim and Yu, 2010), auditor conservatism (Han and Moon, 2009; Kim and Yu, 2011), and audit fees and hours 
(Kwon et al., 2011). As with the studies in other countries that have adopted MAFR requirement, the empirical 
results are also mixed. The one study shows a neutral or negative impact of MAFR on audit quality and/or financial 
reporting quality. For example, Noh (2009) failed to find a significant association between MAFR and discretionary 
accruals. Kim and Yu (2011) find no significant difference in auditor conservatism between mandatorily rotated and 
voluntarily switched auditors. Using firms listed on the KOSDAQ, Lee and Jeon (2011) show that discretionary 
accruals of firms audited by auditors under MAFR are higher than those audited under VAFC. Kwon et al. (2011) 
assert that MAFR increases costs for audit firms and clients but that this increase is not linked to a positive impact 
on financial reporting quality. The other study shows a positive impact of MAFR on audit quality and/or financial 
reporting quality. For instance, Han and Moon (2009) provides evidence that MAFR is positively associated with 
auditor conservatism. Kim and Yu (2010) document that MAFR is significantly and negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals. 
 
Collectively, consistent with different perspectives among regulator, academics, and auditing profession on 
MAFR effectiveness, prior literature on the impact of MAFR on financial reporting quality provides mixed results as 
well. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
 
Under MAFR, two opposing forces may exist. One force is from the fact that a newly rotated auditor can 
fully exercise its professional skepticism during financial statement audits, thus maintaining independence and 
objectivity. Such a force produces a high audit quality, resulting in high quality of financial reporting. The other 
force is from the fact that a newly rotated auditor has little knowledge of its client’s business and industry, making it 
difficult for the auditor to effectively plan the audit. In general, auditors cannot appropriately conduct risk analysis 
of clients’ financial statements without understanding their business and industry. As a result, the auditor cannot 
completely identify a client’s key risk factors, creating a low audit quality and then low quality of financial 
reporting. 
                                                 
5 Carrera et al. (2007) asserted that abolishing MAFR in Spain was a politicized process. Thus, Spanish regulators are reconsidering whether a 
case exists to re-establish the MAFR requirement. 
6 Singapore, India, Indonesia, China, and Thailand in Asia and Brazil also adopted MAFR. See Casterella and Johnston (2012) for a summary of 
the recent literature on MAFR. 
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Therefore, the effectiveness of MAFR depends on which of the two forces (i.e., enhanced auditor 
independence versus lack of understanding of a client’s business and industry) dominates. First, with regard to the 
impact of MAFR on auditor reporting decisions for financially distressed firms, if the force of enhanced auditor 
independence outweighs the lack of understanding of a client’s business and industry, newly rotated auditors under 
MAFR are expected to issue more appropriate audit opinions to financially distressed firms (e.g., GCOs) compared 
with newly switched auditors under VAFC. Specifically, newly rotated auditors are expected to be more likely to 
issue a FGCO to financially distressed firms in their initial audits. In addition, considering that the newly rotated 
auditors with enhanced independence under MAFR are expected to more conservatively conduct their initial audit of 
new clients (FGCO firms), we predict that (FGCO) firms audited by these auditors are more likely to have high-
quality financial reporting such as lower signed discretionary accruals and higher accruals quality. Second, if a lack 
of understanding of a client’s business and industry outweighs the force of enhanced auditor independence, our 
predictions discussed above will be reversed. Lastly, if the force of enhanced independence is not significantly 
different from the lack of understanding of a client’s business and industry, we do not expect a significant difference 
in auditor reporting decisions for financially distressed firms during initial financial statement audits or in financial 
reporting quality between initial audits of (FGCO) firms under MAFR and VAFC. Further, as discussed previously, 
prior literature also provides mixed results on the impact of MAFR on audit quality and/or financial reporting 
quality.  
 
Therefore, we develop the following hypotheses (in the null form). 
 
H1: During first-year audits, no significant difference exists in auditor reporting decisions on a first-time going-
concern audit opinion (FGCO) to financially distressed firms between newly rotated auditors under mandatory audit 
firm rotation and newly switched auditors under voluntary audit firm change. 
 
H2: During first-year audits, no significant difference exists in the earnings quality between (FGCO) firms audited 
by newly rotated auditors under mandatory audit firm rotation and newly switched auditors under voluntary audit 
firm change. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
3.1 Research Design 
 
We test Hypothesis 1, using the following logit model. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
Probability (FGCOit=1) = F(b0 + b1 VAFCit+ b2 MAFRit + b3 SIZEit + b4 BIG4it  + b5 GRWit  
+b6 LEVit+b7 ROAit+b8 Zit+b9 CZit +b10 MCGit + b11 FCGit +b12 CASHit) (1) 
 
Following Dodd et al. (1984) and Loudder et al. (1992), in model (1), the dependent variable, FGCO, is 
coded 1 for firms that received a going-concern audit opinion for the current fiscal year’s financial statements but an 
unqualified audit opinion for previous year. VAFC and MAFR, the test variables, are equal to 1 for firms that 
voluntarily changed their auditor and whose auditor is mandatorily rotated, respectively. If mandatorily rotated 
auditors conduct their audits more independently, we expect that both the coefficient of MAFR and the difference 
between the coefficients of MAFR and VAFC will be significantly positive. Following prior studies, we control for 
firm size (SIZE), Big 4 auditors (BIG4), sales growth (GRW), leverage (LEV), profitability (ROA), and financial 
risk/distress (Z, CZ). SIZE is measured as the logarithm of total assets. Mutchler et al. (1997) suggest that auditors 
are more likely to issue going-concern audit opinions to smaller firms. Therefore, we expect a negative association 
between FGCO and firm size (SIZE). The BIG4 variable is included because the Big 4 auditors are less likely to 
modify the opinions of bankrupt firms (DeFond and Lennox, 2011). However, the studies of Mutchler et al. (1997) 
and Kim et al. (2013) find no significant difference between GCO and Big 4 auditors. We control for sales growth 
(GRW) (Ashbaugh-Skife et al., 2007). In particular, growing firms are more likely to encounter a variety of internal 
issues such as internal control, staffing, and a more complex operating environment, which makes it more difficult 
for financially distressed firms to escape current going-concern issues. We also include the ratio of total liabilities to 
total book value of equity (LEV). Raghunandan and Rama (1995) and DeFond et al. (2002) find that GCO firms 
have higher leverage. Therefore, we expect that FGCO is positively correlated with LEV. Less profitable firms are 
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more likely to receive GCO (Mutchler et al., 1997; Lee et al., 2005); therefore, we include return on assets (ROA) 
for firm performance and expect a negative association with FGCO. We control for financial distress and financial 
risk using the Altman (1964) Z-score (Z) and the change in the Z-score (CZ) (Mutchler, 1984). In addition, using the 
finding that the effectiveness of internal monitoring devices (e.g., effective audit committees) is positively correlated 
with the issuance of GCO (Carcello and Neal, 2003), we control for the corporate governance variables of large 
shareholders’ holdings (MCG) and foreign shareholders’ holdings (FCG). Bruynseels and Willekens (2011) 
document that liquid or sellable resources such as cash and cash equivalents and property, plant, and equipment can 
mitigate the issuance of a going-concern audit opinion. Thus, we control for CASH, which is measured as cash and 
cash equivalents deflated by lagged total assets. 
 
Next, to test Hypothesis 2 on the association between MAFR and earnings quality, we use signed 
discretionary accruals and accruals quality as proxies for earnings quality. First, we explore the association of 
MAFR with discretionary accruals. Following the model in Kothari et al. (2005), we measure the performance-
based discretionary accruals that reflect firm performance (ROA). The measurement procedure of discretionary 
accruals is as follows. First, we cross-sectionally estimate the coefficients of model (2) for firms with non-going-
concern audit opinions by year and two-digit industry. Then, these previously estimated coefficients are used to 
compute discretionary accruals (DA) in model (3) for the sample firms in this study.  
 
Models (2) and (3) are as follows:  
 
TAit = a1 + a2 (ΔREVit – ΔARit) + a3 PPEit + a4ROAit + εit  (2) 
 
DAit = TAit –[ā1 + ā2 (ΔREVit – ΔARit) + ā3 PPEit + ā4 ROAit]  (3) 
 
where TA represents total accruals measured as net income minus operating cash flows, ΔREV represents change in 
sales, ΔAR represents change in accounts receivable, PPE represents the gross amount of property, plant, and 
equipment, and ROA represents return on assets measured as earnings before tax and interests divided by lagged 
total assets. All variables except for ROA in model (2) are deflated by lagged total assets. 
 
To test the association between a first-time going-concern audit opinion and discretionary accruals under 
MAFR, we establish model (4) as follows: 
 
DAit = β0 + β1 FGCOit + β2 VAFCit + β3 FGCO*VAFCit + β4 MAFRit+ β5 FGCO*MAFRit  
+ Controls (SIZE, BTM, LEV, CFO, GRW, Z, CZ,LOSS, Big4, ROAit-1, ROAit-1
2
, MCG, FCG
 
)  
+ ∑IND + ∑YR + εit  (4) 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
where the dependent variable is discretionary accruals (DA) and the test variable is the interaction term of FGCO 
and MAFR. If new auditors under MAFR provide high quality (“more conservative”) audits to FGCO firms in their 
initial audits, we expect that the coefficient of FGCO*MAFR will be significantly negative. Such a result would 
suggest that newly rotated auditors play a critical role in preventing income-increasing behavior of FGCO firms. 
 
Following prior studies, we control for the factors affecting discretionary accruals, such as firm size (SIZE), 
book-to-market ratio (BTM), leverage (LEV), operating cash flows (CFO), and sales growth (GRW). Following 
Becker et al. (1998), we include firm size (SIZE), which influences discretionary accruals. BTM is a measure of 
growth opportunities. Butler et al. (2004) document that the book-to-market ratio is negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals. The debt-to-book value of equity (LEV) is positively associated with discretionary accruals 
because firms with high debt have an incentive to engage in earnings management to increase earnings (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994). Operating cash flows (CFO) is expected to be negatively associated with discretionary accruals 
(Dechow et al., 1998; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998). Because growing firms are more likely to invest working 
capital, such as accounts receivable and inventory, to support current and/or future sales growth, sales growth 
(GRW) is expected to be positively associated with discretionary accruals. We also control for financial distress 
using the Altman (1967) Z-score (Z), change in Z-score (CZ), and loss firms (LOSS). We include Big 4 auditors 
(BIG4) and lagged return on assets (ROA) to control for audit quality and firms’ performance, respectively. We also 
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include lagged ROA square to control for the non-linear relationship between firm performance and discretionary 
accruals (Kothari et al., 2005; Butler et al., 2004). We include large shareholders’ holdings (MCG) and foreign 
shareholders’ holdings (FCG) to control for corporate governance. 
 
Next, accruals quality is another popular proxy for earnings quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Dechow et 
al., 2011). Following the McNichols (2002)’s model, which modifies Dechow and Dichev (2002), we cross-
sectionally estimate Model (5). Accrual Quality is defined as the studentized residuals estimated Model (5). Larger 
(smaller) standard deviations of residuals represent lower (higher) accrual quality. Then, we formulate an empirical 
model (6) to control for factors affecting accrual quality based on a prior relevant study. In model (6), our interest 
variable is the interaction term FGCO*MAFR.  
 
WCAit = c0 + c1CFOit-1 + c2CFOit + c3CFOit+1 + c4ΔREVit + c5PPEit + εit (5) 
 
Accrual Qualityit = γ0 + γ1 FGCOit + γ2 VAFCit + γ3 FGCO*VAFCit + γ4 MAFRit+ γ5 FGCO*MAFRit  
+ γ6 SIZEit + γ7 BTMit + γ8 LEVit + γ9 CFOit+ γ10 LnSALEit + γ11 Zit + γ12 BIG4it + γ13 LOSSit  
+ γ14 ROAit-1+ γ15 ROAit-1
2 
+ εit  (6) 
 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
where WCA represents working capital accruals measured as ((Δcurrent assets – Δcash and cash equivalents)-
(Δcurrent liabilities –Δshort-term liabilities)), CFO represents operating cash flows, ΔREV represents change in 
sales, and PPE represents the gross amount of property, plant, and equipment. All variables in model (5) are deflated 
by lagged total assets. 
 
3.2 Sample and Data 
 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the sample selection procedure. The initial sample size is 9,078 non-financial 
institutions with unqualified audit opinions listed on the Korean stock exchanges from 2006 to 2010. We exclude 
financial institutions because they have a different financial reporting and operating environment, and we drop 189 
firm-year observations because of missing financial data. The final sample is comprised of 8,889 firm-year 
observations. 
 
We obtain financial data from the KIS-Value and TS-2000 databases. Auditor change and going-concern 
audit opinions are hand-collected from audit reports available from the Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer 
System (DART, http://dart.fss.or.kr).  
 
 
Panel B of Table 1 presents a yearly sample distribution of the final sample (n=8,889), which is composed of 
three subsamples: 1) non-switched firms (n=6,889), 2) voluntarily switched firms (n=1,292), and 3) mandatorily 
rotated firms (n=708). Each subsample has 388 (183), 142 (45), and 65 (32) GCO (FGCO) firms, respectively. 
Consistent with the results of Xu et al. (2011), which reported an increase in GCO firms during global economic 
recession periods, GCO firms increased during the global financial crisis from 2007 (n=125) to 2008 (n=213). The 
number (n=382) of mandatorily rotated firms was largest in 2008. 
 
Next, we develop a subsample of financially distressed firms from the full sample; we define such firms as 
having a net loss or negative operating cash flows. Panel C of Table 1 presents a yearly sample distribution of 3,898 
financially distressed firms. The sample size of each of the three subsamples of non-switched firms, voluntarily 
switched firms, and mandatorily rotated firms is significantly reduced to 2,955, 618, and 325 firm-year observations, 
respectively. However, the number of GCO or FGCO firms in each subsample is almost unchanged.  See Appendix 
for variable definitions. 
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Table 1. Sample 
Panel A: Sample selection  
Non-banking firm-years listed on Korean Stock Exchange during 2006–2010 9,078 
(-) Firm-years for which financial data are not available (189) 
Final sample 8,889 
 
Panel B: Yearly distribution of full sample 
  
Auditor Change  
  
Voluntary Audit 
Firm Change 
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation  
 Non-Auditor Change (VAFC) (MAFR)  
Year 
GCO 
(FGCO) 
Non-
GCO 
Sub-
total 
GCO 
(FGCO) 
Non-
GCO 
Sub-
total 
GCO 
(FGCO) 
Non-
GCO 
Sub-
total 
Sub-
Total 
Total 
2006 76(37) 1,374 1,450 21(6) 223 244 2(1) 51 53 297 1,747 
2007 89(48) 1,355 1,444 25(8) 200 225 11(3) 131 142 367 1,811 
2008 117(68) 993 1,110 50(25) 297 347 46(28) 336 382 729 1,839 
2009 72(22) 1,370 1,442 38(4) 214 252 6(0) 75 81 333 1,775 
2010 34 (8) 1,409 1,443 8(2) 116 224 0(0) 50 50 274 1,717 
Total 388(183) 6,501 6,889 142(45) 1,150 1,292 65(32) 643 708 2,000 8,889 
 
Panel C: Yearly distribution of financially distressed sample 
  
Auditor Change 
 
  
Voluntary Audit Firm 
Change 
Total Mandatory 
Audit Firm Rotation  
 
Non-Auditor Change (VAFC) (MAFR) 
 
Year 
GCO 
(FGCO) 
Non-
GCO 
Sub-
total 
GCO 
(FGCO) 
Non-
GCO 
Sub-
total 
GCO 
(FGCO) 
Non-
GCO 
Sub- 
total 
Sub- 
total  
2006 73(36) 502 575 21(6) 87 108 2(1) 20 22 130 705 
2007 88(48) 567 655 25(8) 87 112 11(3) 39 50 162 817 
2008 115(68) 471 586 49(25) 137 186 46(28) 157 203 389 975 
2009 70(22) 483 553 36(4) 85 121 6(0) 31 37 158 711 
2010 31(8) 555 586 7(2) 84 91 0(0) 13 13 104 690 
Total 377(182) 2,578 2,955 138(45) 480 618 65(32) 260 325 943 3,898 
 
GCO is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year’s financial statements, 
and 0 otherwise 0. FGCO is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year’s 
financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion for previous fiscal year’s financial statements. VAFC is equal 
to 1 if auditors are voluntarily changed, and 0 otherwise. MAFR is equal to 1 if auditors are mandatorily rotated, and 
0 otherwise. Financially distressed firms are defined those that have a net loss or negative operating cash flows.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample (n=8,889). The mean (median) of DA is –0.012 (0.022). Of 
the 8,889 firm-observations, 595 (6.7%) received GCOs for the current fiscal year’s financial statements, 260 (2.9%) 
received FGCOs, 1,292 (14.5%) voluntarily switched their auditors, and 708 (8.0%) mandatorily changed their 
auditors. The mean (median) of the logarithm of total assets (SIZE) is 18.459 (18.192), 54.3% of the final sample 
firm-observations are audited by Big 4 auditors, and 29.9% are loss firms. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. Min Q1 Q3 Max 
DA –0.012 0.022 0.247 –4.920 –0.059 0.089 1.361 
GCO 0.067 0.000 0.249 0.000  0.000  0.000 1.000 
FGCO 0.029 0.000 0.169 0.000  0.000  0.000 1.000 
VAFC 0.145 0.000 0.353 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MAFR 0.080 0.000 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 18.459 18.192 1.435 14.404 17.493 19.114 25.398 
Big4 0.543 1.000 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
GRW 0.148 0.072 1.299 –2.408 –0.053 0.208 66.918 
LEV 1.083 0.704 1.952 –56.430 0.329 1.300 36.896 
ROA 0.036 0.042 0.139 –3.165 –0.001 0.096 1.013 
Z 3.442 2.557 3.367 –27.017 1.547 3.807 69.522 
MCG 0.222 0.187 0.219 0.000 0.068 0.389 1.000 
FCG 0.0575 0.005 0.115 0.000 0.000 0.054 0.875 
CASH 0.081 0.050 0.100 0.000 0.016 0.099 1.201 
BTM 2.227 1.234 2.890 –43.374 0.701 2.087 55.591 
CFO 0.032 0.041 0.162 –2.365 –0.025 0.110 1.005 
LOSS 0.299 0.000 0.458 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 3 shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations among the dependent and independent variables used 
in the empirical models of this study. The Pearson correlations (–0.041 and –0.027, respectively) of VAFC and 
MAFR with DA are significantly negative, suggesting that both voluntarily switched and mandatorily rotated 
auditors deter firms’ income-increasing behavior in their initial audits. Additionally, the correlations (0.070 and 
0.029, respectively) of VAFC and MAFR with GCO are significantly positive, suggesting that both voluntarily 
switched and mandatorily rotated auditors are more likely to issue going-concern audit opinions in their initial 
audits. FGCO is positively correlated with VAFC but insignificant, whereas FGCO is significantly and positively 
correlated with MAFR at the 1 percent level, providing preliminary evidence that newly rotated auditors under 
MAFR are more likely to issue a first-time going-concern audit opinion. Additionally, as expected, GCO is 
significantly and positively correlated with LEV and LOSS and significantly and negatively correlated with SIZE and 
Z. Unexpectedly, GCO is significantly and negatively correlated with BIG4. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
Table 3. Correlation Analysis 
 
DA FGCO GCO VAFC MAFR SIZE BTM BIG4 LEV Z GRW LOSS 
DA 1 –0.269*** –0.277*** –0.041*** –0.027*** 0.170*** 0.037*** 0.066*** –0.016 0.039*** –0.058*** –0.213*** 
FGCO –0.138*** 1 0.648*** 0.013 0.027*** –0.124*** –0.013 –0.073*** –0.024*** –0.035*** –0.028*** 0.258*** 
GCO –0.125*** 0.648*** 1 0.070*** 0.029*** –0.211*** 0.027 –0.154*** 0.007 –0.051*** –0.022** 0.380*** 
VAFC –0.032*** 0.013 0.069*** 1 –0.121*** –0.125*** 0.026** –0.067*** 0.006 0.018*** 0.050*** 0.037*** 
MAFR –0.015 0.027*** 0.029*** –0.121*** 1 0.060*** –0.001 –0.015 0.005 –0.007 –0.015 0.028*** 
SIZE 0.127
***
 –0.138*** –0.240*** –0.142*** 0.069*** 1 –0.001 0.326*** 0.022** –0.002 –0.001 –0.246*** 
BTM 0.161
***
 –0.095*** –0.086*** –0.011 –0.006 0.141*** 1 –0.019 –0.005 –0.006 0.001 –0.031*** 
BIG4 0.011 –0.073*** –0.154*** –0.067*** –0.015 0.307*** –0.041*** 1 0.007 0.004 –0.016 –0.196*** 
LEV –0.033*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.001 0.015 0.187*** –0.046*** 0.012 1 –0.007 –0.003 0.031*** 
Z 0.054
***
 –0.253*** –0.372*** –0.038*** –0.044*** 0.080*** –0.171*** 0.131*** –0.500*** 1 –0.003 –0.028*** 
GRW –0.204*** –0.111*** –0.156*** 0.033*** –0.006 0.079*** –0.011 0.053*** 0.075*** 0.199*** 1 –0.022** 
LOSS –0.122*** 0.258*** 0.380*** 0.037*** 0.028*** –0.277*** –0.163*** –0.196*** 0.157*** –0.546*** –0.254*** 1 
The numbers above (below) the diagonal are the Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
4.3 Empirical Results Of Univariate Analysis 
 
Panel A of Table 4 provides the results of the t-test and the non-parametric test between GCO and non-
GCO firms for the full sample. Most variables are significantly different between the two groups. Consistent with 
the findings of the prior literature, GCO firms have smaller firm size (SIZE), lower operating cash flows (CFO), 
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lower profitability (ROA), greater financial distress (Z), less sellable resources (CASH), and negative net income 
(LOSS). Unexpectedly, however, Big 4 auditors are less likely to issue GCOs. Panel B of Table 4 provides the 
results of the univariate analysis for the subsample of financially distressed firms. The results are similar to those in 
Panel A of Table 4. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
Table 4. Univariate Analysis 
Panel A: GCO firms vs. non-GCO firms for the full sample 
Variable GCO Firms Non-GCO Firms Difference In 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean (t-stat.) Median (z-stat.) 
DA –0.268 –0.086 0.007 0.024 –27.19*** –11.81*** 
VAFC 0.239 0.000 0.140 0.000 6.61*** 6.59*** 
MAFR 0.109 0.000 0.078 0.000 2.76*** 2.76*** 
SIZE 17.327 17.277 18.540 18.266 –20.39*** –22.68*** 
BIG4 0.255 0.000 0.564 1.000 –14.78*** –14.60*** 
GRW 0.043 –0.139 0.155 0.078 –2.04** –14.53*** 
LEV 1.373 1.029 1.062 0.692 0.69 6.08*** 
ROA –0.197 –0.161 0.053 0.048 –47.25*** –34.44*** 
Z –2.448 –1.772 3.866 2.690 –4.77*** –34.53*** 
MCG 0.152 0.115 0.227 0.200 –8.00*** –4.90*** 
FCG 0.021 0.001 0.059 0.006 –8.06*** –7.14*** 
CASH 0.063 0.018 0.052 0.097 4.73*** –13.52*** 
BTM 3.038 0.682 2.199 1.248 0.97 –7.09*** 
CFO –0.200 –0.140 0.049 0.048 –39.23*** –28.92*** 
LOSS 0.950 1.000 0.253 0.000 38.77*** 35.86*** 
n 595 8,294   
 
Panel B: GCO firms vs. non-GCO firms for the financially distressed sample 
 GCO firms Non-GCO firms Difference in 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean (t-stat.) Median (z-stat.) 
DA –0.278 –0.105 0.036 0.081 –20.82*** –15.32*** 
VAFC 0.237 0.000 0.145 0.000 5.70*** 5.67*** 
MAFR 0.112 0.000 0.080 0.000 2.57*** –2.57*** 
SIZE 17.298 17.267 18.300 18.061 –17.85*** –19.41*** 
BIG4 0.250 0.000 0.476 1.000 –10.25*** –10.12*** 
GRW 0.042 –0.147 0.148 0.032 –1.51 –10.71*** 
LEV 1.339 1.024 1.443 0.904 –0.09 1.87* 
ROA –0.202 –0.164 –0.155 0.003 –30.48*** –27.01*** 
Z –2.559 –1.894 3.370 1.900 –2.83*** –29.23*** 
MCG 0.152 0.153 0.224 0.194 –7.79*** –5.70*** 
FCG 0.021 0.002 0.041 0.004 –5.07*** –4.93*** 
CASH 0.063 0.618 0.067 0.038 –1.03 –8.86*** 
BTM 3.101 0.675 2.038 1.145 0.79 –5.90*** 
CFO –0.208 –0.144 –0.049 –0.029 –22.09*** –18.00*** 
LOSS 0.974 1.000 0.631 1.000 16.95*** 16.35*** 
n 580 3,318   
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
DA is discretionary accruals measured following Kothari et al. (2005). GCO is equal to 1 for firms that received a 
going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year’s financial statements, and 0 otherwise 0. FGCO is equal to 1 for 
firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year’s financial statements but an unqualified audit 
opinion for previous fiscal year’s financial statements. VAFC is equal to 1 if auditors are voluntarily changed, and 0 
otherwise. MAFR is equal to 1 if auditors are mandatorily rotated, and 0 otherwise. Financially distressed firms are 
defined those that have a net loss or negative operating cash flows. 
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4.4 Empirical Results of Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 
4.4.1 Relation between Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and FGCO 
 
To test Hypothesis 1 on the association between MAFR and a first-time going-concern audit opinion 
decision, we confine the test sample to financially distressed firms following the prior literature. Table 5 presents the 
results of the logistic regressions after controlling for the factors that affect auditors’ GCO decisions. According to 
the results, the coefficient (0.493) of MAFR is positive and statistically significant (p<0.067), whereas the coefficient 
(–0.079) of VAFC is negative and statistically insignificant, suggesting that auditors under MAFR are more likely to 
issue a FGCO to financially distressed firms in their first-year audits compared with auditors under VAFC. These 
results indicate that newly rotated auditors under MAFR make more conservative reporting decisions than those 
under VAFC, supporting the adoption of MAFR.  See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
Table 5. Integrated Logit Analysis For Financially Distressed Sample (N=3,898) 
Variable Exp. Sign Coefficients Standard Error Wald ChiSq. Pr>ChiSq. 
Intercept ? 1.429 1.427 1.002 0.316 
VAFC – –0.079 0.193 0.169 0.680 
MAFR + 0.493 0.269 3.347 0.067 
SIZE – –0.225 0.080  7.957 0.005 
BIG4 ? 0.155 0.156 0.987 0.320 
GRW – –0.118 0.082 2.078 0.149 
LEV + –0.003 0.002 2.288 0.133 
ROA – –1.542 0.503 9.397 0.002 
Z – –0.167 0.022 56.198 <0.001 
CZ + 0.000 0.001  0.021 0.885 
MCG 
+ 
+ 
–0.003 0.004 0.826 0.363 
FCG – –0.000 0.010 0.001 0.990 
CASH – –2.591 0.931  7.746 0.005 
Max-rescaled R-square: 0.196 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
Dependent variable is FGCO, which is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the 
current fiscal year’s financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion for previous fiscal year’s financial 
statements. VAFC is equal to 1 if auditors are voluntarily changed, and 0 otherwise. MAFR is equal to 1 if auditors 
are mandatorily rotated, and 0 otherwise. Financially distressed firms are defined those that have a net loss or 
negative operating cash flows. 
 
4.4.1.1 Relation between Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Discretionary Accruals 
 
Next, we test Hypothesis 2 on the association between MAFR and discretionary accruals. Contrary to 
previous analysis in Table 5, we expand our test sample to the full sample. First, we test the association between 
MAFR and discretionary accruals and between VAFC and discretionary accruals. Table 6 presents the OLS 
regression results. As shown in Table 6, we find that the coefficient for VAFC+FGCO*VAFC 
(MAFR+FGCO*MAFR) is significantly negative at the 5 (1) percent level, suggesting that both voluntarily auditor-
changed and mandatorily auditor-rotated firms have relatively lower signed discretionary accruals (i.e., higher 
earnings quality) compared with auditor-unchanged firms. Also, we find that both coefficients of FGCO*VAFC and 
FGCO*MAFR are significantly negative at the 1 percent level, indicating that a negative association between auditor 
change and rotation and discretionary accruals is more pronounced for firms receiving a first-time going-concern 
audit opinion. Next, we test whether or not the negative association between MAFR and discretionary accruals is 
stronger than that between VAFC and discretionary accruals. F-test results show that the coefficient difference 
between (VAFC+FGCO*VAFC) and (MAFR+FGCO*MAFR) or between FGCO*VAFC and FGCO*MAFR is 
significant at the 1 percent level. Considering that the coefficient (–0.375) of (MAFR+FGCO*MAFR) is more 
negative than that (–0.110) of (VAFC+FGCO*VAFC) and that the coefficient (–0.382) of FGCO*MAFR is more 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2015 Volume 31, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1100 The Clute Institute 
negative than that (–0.095) of FGCO*VAFC, the F-test results above suggest that firms audited by mandatorily 
rotated auditors have lower signed discretionary accruals in their initial audits than firms audited by voluntarily 
changed auditors. Particularly, the results are more pronounced for firms that received FGCOs from mandatorily 
rotated new auditors in the initial audits. 
 
Taken together, the all findings above suggest that, although both voluntarily changed and mandatorily rotated new 
auditors are likely to have fresh eyes and conservatively conduct their first-year financial statement audits, 
mandatorily rotated auditors are more likely to conduct their initial audits with more conservative fresh eyes, 
particularly for FGCO firms. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
Table 6. OLS Results For Association Between MAFR And Discretionary Accruals Focusing On FGCO Firms 
Variable Exp. Sign Coefficients t-statistics 
Intercept ? –0.080*** –2.61 
FGCO ? –0.322*** –16.49 
VAFC ? –0.015** –2.49 
FGCO*VAFC ? –0.095** –2.16 
MAFR ? 0.007 0.81 
FGCO*MAFR ? –0.382*** –5.80 
SIZE + 0.008*** 4.81 
BTM – 0.002*** 3.51 
LEV + –0.003*** –3.67 
CFO – –0.835*** –43.02 
GRW + –0.014*** –7.62 
Z – 0.000*** 2.28 
CZ – –0.001 –1.43 
Big4 – 0.006** 2.22 
LOSS ? –0.100*** –19.63 
ROAt–1 ? 0.183
*** 10.16 
ROA2t–1 ? 0.058
*** 10.78 
MCG ? 0.000** 1.99 
FCG ? –0.000** –2.41 
IND ? Included 
YR ? Included 
Adjusted R2  0.312 
F-statistics  145.46*** 
No of Obs.  8,889 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
Dependent variable is DA, which is discretionary accruals measured following Kothari et al. (2005). GCO 
is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year’s financial statements, and 0 
otherwise 0. FGCO is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year’s 
financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion for previous fiscal year’s financial statements. VAFC is equal 
to 1 if auditors are voluntarily changed, and 0 otherwise. MAFR is equal to 1 if auditors are mandatorily rotated, and 
0 otherwise. 
 
4.4.1.2 Relation between Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Accruals Quality 
 
In addition to discretionary accruals, accruals quality is another popular earnings quality measurement 
(Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Dechow et al., 2011). In this section, we investigate whether mandatorily rotated new 
auditors under MAFR produce higher accruals quality.  
 
First, we test the association between MAFR and accruals quality and between VAFC and accruals quality. 
Table 7 reports the association between MAFR and accruals quality for the full sample. Consistent with previous 
results on discretionary accruals in Table 6, we find that the coefficients for both (VAFC+FGCO*VAFC) and 
(MAFR+FGCO*MAFR) are significantly negative at the 1 percent level, suggesting that both voluntarily auditor-
changed and mandatorily auditor-rotated firms have relatively higher accruals quality compared with auditor-
unchanged firms. The negative association between auditor change and rotation and accruals quality is also more 
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pronounced for firms receiving a first-time going-concern audit opinion on the basis of the finding that the 
coefficients of both FGCO*VAFC and FGCO*MAFR are significantly negative at the 1 percent levels. Next, we test 
whether or not the negative association between MAFR and accruals quality is stronger than that between VAFC 
and accruals quality. F-test results show that the difference in coefficients between (VAFC+FGCO*VAFC) and 
(MAFR+FGCO*MAFR) or between FGCO*VAFC and FGCO*MAFR is significant at the 1 percent level. 
Considering that the coefficient (–1.213) of (MAFR+FGCO*MAFR) is more negative than that (–0.375) of 
(VAFC+FGCO*VAFC) and that the coefficient (–1.194) of FGCO*MAFR is more negative than that (–0.427) of 
FGCO*VAFC, the F-test results above suggest that firms audited by mandatorily rotated auditors have higher 
accruals quality in their initial audits compared with firms audited by voluntarily changed auditors. In particular, the 
results are more pronounced for FGCO firms under MAFR and support the previous findings in Table 6. See 
Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
Table 7. OLS Results For Association Between MAFR And Accrual Quality Focusing On FGCO Firms 
Variable Coefficients t-statistics 
Intercept –0.179 –1.06 
FGCO –0.050 –0.65 
VAFC –0.068* –1.79 
FGCO*VAFC –0.427*** –2.86 
MAFR –0.019 –0.38 
FGCO*MAFR –1.194*** –5.32 
SIZE 0.080*** 4.17 
BTM 0.011*** 5.83 
LEV –0.015*** –3.62 
CFO –1.167*** –9.53 
LnSALE –0.077*** –4.39 
Z 0.005* 1.76 
Big4 –0.008** –0.34 
LOSS 0.026 0.91 
ROAt–1 1.959
*** 12.24 
ROA2t–1 0.352
 1.08 
Adjusted R2 0.105 
F-statistics 42.03*** 
No of Obs. 8,889 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
Dependent variable is Accrual Quality, which is studentized residual estimated following McNichols 
(2002). GCO is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year’s financial 
statements, and 0 otherwise 0. FGCO is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current 
fiscal year’s financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion for previous fiscal year’s financial statements. 
VAFC is equal to 1 if auditors are voluntarily changed, and 0 otherwise. MAFR is equal to 1 if auditors are 
mandatorily rotated, and 0 otherwise. 
 
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
In this section, we develop three subsamples from the full sample: 1) financially distressed firms, 2) only 
auditor-changed firms, and 3) financially distressed and auditor-changed firms. As mentioned previously, financially 
distressed firms are defined as firms with a net loss or negative operating cash flows. Then, we re-conduct the same 
regression in Table 6 for each subsample. The results are shown in Table 8. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 8 report the 
regression results for financially distressed firms. According to the results, the coefficient (–0.399) of (MAFR + 
FGCO*MAFR) is negative and significant at the 1 percent level, whereas the coefficient (–0.097) of (VAFC + 
FGCO*VAFC) is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. Additionally, the F-test for the coefficients between 
(VAFC + FGCO*VAFC) and (MAFR + FGCO*MAFR) is still significant at the 5 percent level (p-value: 0.017). 
Collectively, these results support the previous findings that newly rotated auditors with a fresh eye under MAFR 
more conservatively conduct their initial financial statement audits. 
 
Next, we re-conduct the regression for the subsample of only auditor-changed firms (i.e., firms that 
voluntarily or mandatorily switched their auditors), and the results are shown in columns 5 and 6 in Table 8. 
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Consistent with the previous results in Table 6, we find that the coefficient (–0.353) of (MAFR + FGCO*MAFR) is 
significantly negative at the 1 percent level, suggesting that newly rotated auditors under MAFR are more likely to 
deter their clients’ income-increasing behavior in their initial audits. Lastly, for the subsample consisting of 
financially distressed and auditor-changed firms, we consistently find that the coefficient (–0.330) of (MAFR + 
FGCO*MAFR) is significant at the 5 percent level. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
Taken together, in line with the arguments made by proponents of MAFR, we find that newly rotated 
auditors under MAFR are more conservative in conducting their first-year financial statement audits compared with 
newly switched auditors under VAFC, thus deterring firms’ income-increasing behavior.  
 
Table 8. OLS Results On Association Between MAFR  
And Discretionary Accruals For Financially Distressed And/Or Auditor-Changed Firms 
 
 Financially  
Distressed Firms 
Only Auditor- 
Changed Firms 
Financially Distressed and 
Auditor-Changed Firms 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Exp. Sign Coefficients t-statistics Coefficients t-statistics Coefficients t-statistics 
Intercept ? –0.499*** –6.67 –0.198* –1.88 –0.829** –2.19 
FGCO ? –0.351*** –11.39 –0.388*** –6.46 –0.384*** –3.65 
VAFC ? –0.032** –2.26 - - - - 
FGCO*VAFC ? –0.065 –0.96 - - - - 
MAFR ? 0.022 1.16 0.002 0.02 0.031 0.75 
FGCO*MAFR ? –0.421*** –4.17 –0.355*** –3.65 –0.361** –2.14 
SIZE + 0.027*** 6.57 0.001** 2.34 0.041* 1.90 
BTM – 0.003*** 3.83 0.001** 2.11 0.008*** 2.82 
LEV + –0.004*** –3.43 –0.001 –0.65 –0.001 –0.20 
CFO – –0.728*** –16.82 –0.658*** –11.20 –0.305** –2.02 
GRW + –0.028*** –6.16 –0.055*** –7.18 –0.067*** –4.45 
Z – 0.000 1.50 0.004*** 6.30 0.004* 1.83 
CZ – –0.000 –0.80 –0.007*** –6.63 –0.008*** –3.66 
Big4 – 0.018* 1.81 0.013 0.91 0.045 1.00 
LOSS ? - - –0.104*** –6.33 - - 
ROAt–1 ? 0.382
*** 7.14 –0.003 –0.04 –0.217 –0.74 
ROA2t–1 ? 0.039 0.28 –0.350
** –2.45 –0.512 –1.09 
MCG ? 0.001** 2.44 0.000 0.27 0.000 0.13 
FCG ? –0.000 –0.05 –0.001* –1.80 –0.004* –1.83 
IND ? Included Included Included 
YR ? Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2  0.222 0.266 0.193 
F-statistics  45.19*** 26.92*** 6.73*** 
No of Obs.  3,898 2,000 682 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
Dependent variable is DA, which is discretionary accruals measured following Kothari et al. (2005). GCO 
is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year’s financial statements, and 0 
otherwise 0. FGCO is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year’s 
financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion for previous fiscal year’s financial statements. VAFC is equal 
to 1 if auditors are voluntarily changed, and 0 otherwise. MAFR is equal to 1 if auditors are mandatorily rotated, and 
0 otherwise. Financially distressed firms are defined those that have a net loss or negative operating cash flows. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The recent shock to the capital markets from the global financial crisis after the high-profile accounting 
scandals in the beginning of the 21
st
 century caused regulators and policy makers to again pay more attention to 
mandatory audit firm rotation as a solution to enhance auditor independence and subsequently improve financial 
reporting quality. In this study, we investigate whether a difference exists in audit quality and financial reporting 
quality between mandatory audit firm rotation and voluntary audit firm change from the perspectives of audit 
opinion decision-making to financially distressed firms, discretionary accruals, and accruals quality.  
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With regard to MAFR, as noted in the previous sections, two competing forces affect auditor independence 
in opposite directions. In other words, newly rotated auditors under MAFR are more likely to be independent and 
have a fresh look during their financial statement audits, leading to an increase in financial reporting quality. 
However, new auditors under MAFR are less likely to understand their clients’ business and industry, which is 
critical to identifying specific risk factors on financial statements, leading to a decrease in financial reporting 
quality. In addition, although a positive perspective exists that auditors are less likely to economically depend on 
their clients, the negative perspective states that MAFR creates high start-up costs. As a result, the association 
between MAFR and auditor reporting decision or financial reporting quality depends on whether positive (negative) 
perspectives of MAFR dominate its negative (positive) ones. Accordingly, prior literature provides mixed or no 
significant results on the effectiveness of MAFR adoption. Therefore, we posit that no significant difference exists 
between MAFR and VAFC regarding audit reporting decisions and financial reporting quality and test the related 
hypotheses.  
 
Consistent with the arguments made by proponents for MAFR, in this study, we find that, compared with 
newly switched auditors under VAFC, newly rotated auditors under MAFR are more likely to issue a first-time 
going-concern audit opinion to financially distressed firms and deter their clients’ income-increasing behavior in 
their first-year audits. We also find that firms audited by MAFR auditors are more likely to have high accruals 
quality. These results are more pronounced for FGCO firms. 
 
Taken together, we provide evidence supporting MAFR adoption that mandatorily rotated new auditors 
under MAFR are more likely to have a fresh eye and be more independent, leading to more conservative audits: a 
greater propensity to issue a first-time going-concern audit opinion to financially distress firms, greater deterrence to 
income-increasing behavior, and higher accruals quality. 
 
Although our analyses are limited to first-year financial statement audits under VAFC or MAFR, overall, our 
findings provide implications to regulators and policy makers in countries considering the adoption of MAFR in the 
future. 
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APPENDIX 
 
1.           Variables used in the GCO model 
 
Variable Definition 
FGCO 
Equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year’s financial 
statements but an unqualified audit opinion for previous fiscal year’s financial statements the previous 
ones, and 0 otherwise; 
VAFC Equal to 1 if auditors are voluntarily changed, and 0 otherwise 
MAFR Equal to 1 if auditors are mandatorily rotated, and 0 otherwise 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
BIG4 
Equal to 1 if firms are audited by one of the Big 4 auditors (Samil, SamJung, AhnJin, HanYoung), and 0 
otherwise 
GRW Change in sales deflated by lagged total sales 
LEV Total liabilities divided by book value of equity 
ROA Earnings before tax and interests divided by lagged total asset 
Z Altman (1968)’s Z-score 
CZ Change in the Altman (1968) Z-score 
MCG The ratio of large shareholders’ holdings to the total number of outstanding common shares 
FCG The ratio of foreign shareholders’ holdings to the total number of outstanding common shares 
CASH Cash and cash equivalent deflated by lagged total assets 
 
2. Additional Variables used in the DA or accruals quality model 
 
Variable Definition 
DA Discretionary accruals measured following Kothari et al. (2005) 
Accrual Quality Studentized residuals estimated following McNichols (2002) 
BTM Total book value of owners’ equity divided by market capitalization 
CFO Operating cash flows deflated by lagged total assets 
LOSS Equal to 1 if net earnings is less than 0, and 0 otherwise 
ROA t-1 Lagged earnings before tax and interests divided by lagged total assets 
ROA2t-1 The square of ROAt–1 
LnSALE Natural logarithm of sales 
ID Industrial dummies 
YR Year dummies 
 
